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I.

Introduction – Reverse Moderate Relativism: The
Missing Piece to the Universality Debate
The question of the universality of human rights norms has challenged scholars and

commentators for decades.1 It is a highly important question from a pragmatic standpoint, because
human rights are sure to be ignored if they are not culturally relevant.2 Because cultural legitimacy is so
crucial to compliance, efforts to actively engage local and international law in the effort to seek universal
values should be applauded. These efforts take three different forms. On one extreme, universalists
1

See, e.g., Kimberly Younce Schooley, Comment, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights, Toward a
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 678-79 (1994); HENRY J STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON (eds.),
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 366-403 (2000) (citing K. DALACOURA,
ISLAM, LIBERALM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); E. COTRAN AND A. SHERIF, EDS., DEMOCRACY,
THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM (1999); A. POLLIS & P. SCHWAB, EDS., HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1979); T. DUNNE & N. WHEELER, EDS., HUMAN RGIHTS IN
GLOBAL POLITICS (1999); ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES
IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AMER.
ANTHROPOLOGIST N. 4 539 (1947); CULTURE AND RIGHTS: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
(JANE K. COWAN ET AL, EDS., 2001); ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT
(1999); Pannikar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept? 12
0 DIOGENES 75 (1982); Rhoda Howard,
Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, ED., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 81 (1991); Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im, Human Rights in Muslim World: SocioPolitical Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 13 (1990); Oscar Schachter,
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 Am. J. Int. L. 848 (1983)); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human
Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
REVIEW 303 (1982); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15 AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1994); Michael Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and
Related Matters, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 468 (1997);; A D RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Rein Mullerson, Universal Human Rights in the Multicultural World:
Reasons and Excuses for, and Circumstances Conducive to their Gross and Systemic Violation, in MEGHNAD DESAI
& PAUL REDFERN (eds.), GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD ORDER 133(1995);
Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 316
(1996); UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 91-118 (2002); Fernando R Teson, International Human
Rights and Cultural Relativism, in PHILIPS ALSTON (ed.), HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 117 (1996); Michael Goodhart,
Origin and Universality in the Human Rights Debate: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalisation 25
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 935 (2003); Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Universalist Controversy. A
Response to Are the Principles of Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the "Asian" Concept
of Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, by Dr. Surya P. Subedi, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 71 (1999);
John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1996); Fernando R.
Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869 (1984-1985); Christina M.
Cerna, Univesality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different SocioCultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994); Reza Afshari, An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the
Discourse of Human Rights 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 235 (1994).
2
Ahmad An-Na’im, Human Rights in Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, supra
note 1, at 15 (“[H]uman rights violations reflect the lack or weakness of cultural legitimacy of international
standards in a society. Insofar as these standards are perceived to be alien to or at variance with the values and
institutions of a people, they are unlikely to elicit commitment or compliance.”).
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argue that all human rights are applicable in all cultures,3 an untenable stance because it eliminates the
tensions between various cultures simply by ignoring them. A much more realistic approach is offered by
the moderate cultural relativists, who accept cultural differences but still strive to find a core group of
universal norms.4 In the area of Islamic law, moderate cultural relativism is best represented by the
outstanding work of Professor Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im to interpret the Qur’an and Sunna consistent
with international human rights norms.5

Moderate cultural relativists such as An-Na’im have accepted

equality as a core right shared across cultures, and their work analyzing equality of the sexes6 and of

3

Schooley, supra note 1, at 691-98.
The term “moderate” distinguishes moderate cultural relativism from strict cultural relativism, a theory holding
that because cultural variation is so great, there are no universally shared norms of any kind. Schooley, supra note
3, at 679-82. Because this article is premised on the believe that some shared norms do transcend cultures, strict
cultural relativism is not discussed further.
5
See, e.g., A. AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); An-Na’Im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim
Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); An-na’im, Islamic law, International Relations and Human Rights:
Challenge and Response, 20 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 17 (1987); An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World:
Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 1, at 46-52.
6
See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q.
202, 208 (1990) (describing the issue of sexual equality as “[p]robably the most celebrated inequality under
traditional Islamic law”); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 36-46 (1990)
(hereinafter “Scriptural Imperatives”) (noting that “[t]he most important general principle of Shari’a influencing the
status and rights of women is the notion of qawama (citing HOLY QUR’AN 4:34: “Men have qawama
[guardianship and authority] over women because of the advantage they [men] have over them [women])).; AnNa’Im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context, supra note 5; Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L
L. 643 (1990); Leila P. Sayeh and Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An Incomplete
Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 311 (1995); Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari’a
and the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1949 (1995); ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 97-130 (1999). Under Islamic law, women generally cannot
hold a political or judicial office, An-Na’im, Scriptural Imperatives, supra, at 37, sometimes lack capacity to initiate
a marriage contract or obtain a unilateral divorce, Arzt, supra, at 223, and may inherit half as much as an equally
situated male. Id. at 208. Monetary compensation for violent crimes (diya) is less for female victims than for
male, An-Na’im, Scriptural Imperatives, supra, at 39, and a woman’s testimony in court is valued at half that of a
man’s. HOLY QUR’AN 2:282 (N.J. DAWOOD, TRANS., 1999); Arzt, supra, at 208; An-Na’im, Scriptural
Imperatives, supra, at 39. According to some interpretations of Shari’a (some of which state-sanctioned), her
husband may chastise her, including “light beating,” Arzt, supra, at 208, demand intercourse at any time, and restrict
her freedom of movement. See, e.g. Human Rights Committee: Third Periodic Report of Yemen, ¶ 141, UN Doc.;
CCPR/C/YEM/2001/3 (Oct. 18, 2001) (“A husband has a right to his wife’s obedience in matters affecting the
family’s interests, particularly with regard to the following: She must … permit him to live with her and enjoy
access to her, … permit him to have licit intercourse with her, … obey his orders without obstinacy and perform her
work in the conjugal home, … not leave the conjugal home without his permission”). Many commentators also
consider polygamy fundamentally incompatible with international human rights standards An-Na’im, Scriptural
Imperatives, supra, at 38-39; Arzt, supra, at 222-23.
4

3

religious groups7 in Islam has been extensive, certainly controversial,8 but in my view highly valuable.9
Similarly, the practical effects of moderate cultural relativism are evident in the momentous legal and

7

See, e.g., Riffat Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qu'ran, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 85 (1996);
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 337 (J. WITTE, JR., & J.D. VAN DER VYVER, EDS., 1996); Arzt, supra note 6, at
208-09; MAYER, supra note 6, at 131-174. Compare HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 9:5 (“Slay them [those
who do not believe in revealed scriptures] wherever you may find them”); Id. at 3:85 (“If anyone desires a religion
other than Islam, never will it be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be among the losers”); to Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter
“UDHR”) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”); UDHR, supra at Art. 2
(“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such … religion”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18, Dec. 19 1966 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter “ICCPR”) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as … religion”). See also Arzt, supra note 6, at 223 (reporting that
“the principles of religious freedom and nondiscrimination against religious minorities are now constitutionally
protected in the majority of Islamic states,” but noting that “some such provisions are in conflict with other
constitutional sections that establish Islam as the official state religion or Shari’a as a principle source of
legislation”). Compare also An-Na’am, Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 23 (“According to Shari’a, a
Muslim who repudiates his faith in Islam, whether directly or indirectly, is guilty of a capital offense punishable by
death”), with UDHR, supra, at Art. 18 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief”) (emphasis added); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 18 (“Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and … [n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”). But see HOLY QUR’AN, supra, at 2:256 (“There should be
no compulsion in religion”).
8
An-Na’im’s approach is controversial particularly because he advocateds expanding the scope of ijtihad (Islamic
legal reasoning) “to enable modern Muslim jurists … to substitute previously enacted texts with other, more general,
texts of Qur’an and Sunna [the two principle textual sources of Islamic Law] despite the categorical nature of the
prior texts.” An-Na’am, Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 49. He defends this technique on the grounds that
“the proposed new rule would also be based on the Qur’an or Sunna, albeit on a new interpretation of the text,” Id.,
but admits that this approach is sure to meet resistance. Id. at 51. See also FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM &
MODERNITY 142 (1982) (“It is … something of an irony to pit the so-called Muslim fundamentalists against the
Muslim modernists, since, so far as their acclaimed procedure goes, the Muslim modernists say exactly the same
things as the so-called Muslim fundamentalists say: that Muslims must go back to the original and definitive
sources of Islam and perform ijtihad on that basis.”).
9
Moderate cultural relativists also argue for a re-interpretation of Islamic law towards international standards in the
areas of criminal defense rights, freedom from slavery, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination. On criminal
defense rights, particularly the use of criminal penalties as retaliation (qisas), Compare Arzt, supra note 6, at 208
(“Islamic law provides for penalties not to promote rehabilitation of the criminal but as a retaliation (qisas), either by
financial extraction or bodily mutilation”) with UDHR, supra note 7, at Art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); ICCPR, supra note 7, at Art. 7 (“No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). On slavery, Compare An-Na’im,
Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 22 (“Although slavery was formally abolished in all Muslim countries
through secular law, the institution itself remains lawful under Shari’a to the present day”), with UDHR, supra, at
Art. 4 (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their
forms”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 8 (“No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms
shall be prohibited. No one shall be held in servitude”). On freedom of expression, Compare An-Na’im, supra, at
23 (“The Shari’a law of apostasy can be used to restrict other human rights such as freedom of expression”), with
UDHR, supra, at Art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression”); ICCPR, supra, at Art.
19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”). On non-discrimination, An-Na’im describes a
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political efforts to reinterpret Muslim status law consistent with human rights instruments, first in Tunisia
a half century ago, and currently in Morocco.10
Concurrent with these laudable efforts, however, another discourse is also warranted: As scholars
continue to analyze, influence, and advocate for a legal shift towards an international standard in some
areas, such as women’s rights, there should be a concurrent dialogue examining the extent to which
international human rights law can or should move towards a more Islamic standard in other domains, an
opinion advanced by An-Na’im in his later work, noting that “the human rights movement cannot achieve
its objectives without strong and sustained political support form different constituencies … [and] is
unlikely to achieve this degree and quality of political support … so long as there is a perception of
exclusive Western authorship of the concept of human rights and its normative implications.”11 In a
previous work, I therefore proposed a new theory, reverse moderate relativism; like moderate cultural
relativism, reverse moderate relativism also seeks to develop a core set of shared rights concepts across
cultures, but it does so “in reverse,” using other legal and cultural systems as the neutral benchmark to be
achieved by international human rights law.12

Without claiming any past causative link in the

three-tiered rights entitlement based on religious adherence under Shari’a, including Muslims; Ahl al-Kitab,
believers in a divinely revealed scripture such as Christians and Jews; and non-believers. Muslims are full citizens
enjoying all Shari’a rights and freedoms. Ahl al-Kitab hold the status of dhimma, a compact with the Muslim state
guarantying them inferior rights and freedoms to Muslims, including lack of equality with Muslims, a lower diya
(financial compensation for murder or bodily harm) than Muslims, non-application of the Muslim hadd of qadhf
(“criminal penalty for the unproven accusation of fornication”), inability of a dhimmi man to marry a Muslim
woman, and subjection to a jizya poll tax. The rights of unbelievers are limited even further, with recognition as
dhimmis as a best-case scenario. An-Na’im, supra, at 24-25. To this, compare UDHR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Everyone
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as …
religion”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,
without distinction of any kind, such as … religion”); but see HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at ** (“You all are
descendants of Adam and Adam is from the Earth. The Arab amongst you has no merit over the non-Arab save with
piety.”).
10
See Tewfik Hakem, Les Députés Marocains ont Adopté à l’unanimité l’égalité juridique entre hommes et femmes,
LE MONDE (Jan. 19, 2004), at 4.
11
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance: The Case of Collective Rights, in THE
ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 7 (MONIQUE CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN ET AL., EDS.,
1998).
12
Jason Morgan-Foster, A New Perspective on the Universality Debate: Reverse Moderate Relativism in the Islamic
Perspective, ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2003). Upon reflection, reverse moderate relativism shares
many common assumptions with Dianne Otto’s “transformative” approach to international human rights, and she
should be credited accordingly. See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29

5

development of international law,13 reverse moderate relativism rather is concerned with future
development of universal norms, arguing for a restructuring of the universality debate from Western
neutrals to local neutrals.14 It is only through the combined use of moderate cultural relativism in certain
areas (such as equality), and reverse moderate relativism in others (such as, I will argue here, solidarity
rights), that the most appropriate core set of universal human rights norms can be established, a set of
rights which is neither neo-colonialist15 nor apologistic.16
With this goal in mind, this article applies reverse moderate relativism in the Islamic context,
recognizing and analyzing one potential area where the efforts to find universal human rights norms
should begin with the teachings of Islamic law: the importance of individual duties, and their role in
shaping the so-called “third generation” of human rights. Although several scholars have discussed the

COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1997); Dianne Otto, Everything Is Dangerous: Some Poststructural Tools
for Rethinking the Universal Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law, AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. (1998); Dianne
Otto, Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative Possibilities in International Human Rights Law, AUSTL.
Y.B. INT'L L. (1997). Professor An-Na’im, in addition to his excellent work in moderate cultural relativism, has
also advocated reverse moderate relativism, arguing, consistent with this article, that an emphasis on solidarity rights
in the international human rights movement would add legitimacy to the quest for universal norms by emphasizing
non-western traditions. See An-Na’im, supra note 11. But, whereas An-Na’im focuses on the group right
component of solidarity rights, this article focuses on their individual duty component.
13
For such an attempt, albeit in the domain of international law generally and not international human rights law,
see Marcel A Boisard, On the Probable influence of Islam on Western Public and International Law, 2 INTL. J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 429 (1980). Boisard’s work provides forceful evidence of the Islamic influence on
international legal concepts as varied as humanitarian law, jus in bello, diplomatic immunity, commercial law,
maritime law, due process, equity, good faith, pacta sunt servanda, and the foundational work of Grotius. But, her
analysis is more historical than legal, and she admits that it represents only a “modest attempt” to begin assessing
the influence of Islam on international legal thought, and “[a] more complete study … remains to be done.” Id. at
429-30.
14
This is a particularly novel argument in the context of Islamic law, as the very idea that Islamic law may have
something to teach international human rights law has been noticeably absent from Western scholarship. Professor
Ann Mayer notes that “Islamic law and Islamic thought have been treated as irrelevant by people involved in the
development of international human rights law. A study of serious treatises by recognized specialists on the
development of international human rights law will not reveal claims on behalf of the possibility of Islamic
inspiration for international human rights law or its historical antecedents.” ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 46 (1991) [re-cited because different edition than that
cited supra note 6].
15
Dr. Adbulaziz Othman Altwaijri, Human rights in Islamic Teachings, ISLAMIC EDUTATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC
AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (ISESCO), at 22-23 (1421H/2001) (noting that although Islamic scholars
“recognize the international legitimacy of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, … [m]any thinkers and
philosophers have started to oppose the western tendency to impose a western interpretation and application of
[it].”).
16
In this author’s view, women’s rights and rights of non-Muslims are two such areas in which the international
human rights movement should not look upon Islamic law apologetically, and in these areas moderate cultural
relativism (interpretation of local norms towards international norms) is more appropriate than reverse moderate
relativism (recognizing the movement of international norms towards local norms). See supra note 6.

6

importance of individual duties in local and regional legal traditions,17 including several examinations of
the role of duties in Islamic law,18 no scholar has examined the potential of Islamic conceptions of duties
to influence our understanding of third generation rights in the context of the debate on the universality of
human rights.19 By attempting this goal, this article will help make the case that, as the international
human rights movement progressively recognizes the importance of human duties,20 a core shared
universal norm will develop with local tradition as its roots.

17

Makau wa Mutua has compellingly revealed the strong presence of duties in African traditions, as codified by the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995). See also Michael C. Davis,
Constitutionalism And Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights And Asian Values 11 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 109 (1998). Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Special Rapporteur on the question of human rights and
responsibilities, examined the use of duties in several regional legal traditions in his initial report. See Human
Rights and Human Responsibilities, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Special Rapportuer appointed by the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to undertake the study requested by the
Commission in its resolution 2000/63, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/107 (19 Mar. 2002) (hereinafter “Report of SR
Martínez”) at paras. 66-76 (duties in the inter-American human rights system), paras. 77-81 (duties in the African
system), paras. 82-84 (duties according to the Cairo Declaration), and paras. 85-86 (duties according to the Helsinki
Final Act). See also Damien Keown, Are There "Human Rights" in Buddhism? 2 J. OF BUDDHIST ETHICS
(1995) available at: http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma/humanrights.html; Editorial, Human Rights: Knots and
Webs, HINDUISM TODAY (1996) available at: http://www.hinduism-today.com/1996/6/1996-6-07.html; Joseph
Chan "Human Rights and Confucian Virtues", 4 HARVARD ASIA Q. (2000) available at:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200003/0003a006.htm.
18
See Ahmad Farrag, Human Rights and Liberties in Islam, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 133, 134-46 (BERTING ET AL., EDS., 1990); Ebrahim Moosa, The
Dilemma Of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185 (2000); Muhammad Tal‘at Al-Ghunaimi, Justice
and Human Rights in Islam, in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1, 6 (Gerald E. Lampe ed., 1997).
19
In fact, the vast majority of comparative scholarship on Islamic law and international law never leaves the
defensive paradigm at all, content to defend Islamic law against an international standard, rather than promote the
adoption of Islamic legal precepts in international law. MAYER, supra note 14, at 46 (“Questions of Islamic law
are only occasionally mentioned in scholarly writing on international human rights – for the sake of comparison with
the international norms or to illustrate the problems of introducing international norms in areas of the developing
world”). Unfortunately, this is even true with respect to the drafters of Islamic human rights schemes such as those
cited infra notes 83-85. Professor Mayer astutely notes that these documents “[e]ven while promoting Islamic
versions of human rights, … seem to regard international human rights as the ultimate norm against which all rights
schemes are inevitably measured and from which they fear to be caught deviating.” MAYER, supra, at 53.
20
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 51 (1992); Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Types of State Duties Imposed by Human Rights
Treaties, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 180-85; James Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to
Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 77 (1993); D. SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE OF DUTY (1994); Ben
Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 565 (2001) (citing U.N. Comm'n on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance, http://www.cgg.ch (1995) (a report on individual responsibilities; A Universal
Declaration of Human Responsibilities, Inter-Action Council (Sept. 1, 1997), available at
http://www.asiawide.or.jp/iac/UDHR/EngDecl1.htm; Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, UNESCO
(1997), available at http://astro.temple.edu/<diff>dialogue/Antho/unesco.htm; Int'l Council of Human Duties, A
Declaration of Human Duties: A Code of Ethics of Shared Responsibilities, http://www.univ.trieste.it/<diff>ichd
(1997); United People's Assembly, A Declaration of Human Responsibilities, http://acgc.org/Ethics/adeclara.htm

7

In Part II, I review the scholarship discussing the development of international human rights,
paying close attention to the newest and most controversial set of human rights norms, the so-called “third
generation” solidarity rights. These solidarity rights share several characteristics not common to previous
international human rights; although most commentators focus exclusively on their “group right”
component, I emphasize their equally important “individual duty” component. In Part III, I show that
although social solidarity and individual duty to the group are among the new developments in the
international human rights movement, they have long been fundamental in Islamic law, and elaborate the
importance of individual duties in Islamic law by examining the complexity of the language of Islamic
duties. In Part IV, I synthesize these previous parts, arguing that, from a reverse moderate relativist point
of view, the move in the international human rights movement towards third generation solidarity rights
marks a shift towards a more Islamic standard, which has traditionally placed high importance on
individual duty to the ummah (group). To elucidate this point, I examine the three most common third
generation solidarity rights – the right to development, the right to a healthy environment, and the right to
peace – finding a strong basis for each in Islamic law. Because Islamic law emphasizes individual duty
within group solidarity, examination of Islamic notions of these third-generation solidarity rights can help
the human rights movement better understand the undervalued element of individual duty which is
present in such rights alongside their “group right” element.

II.

Social Solidarity: The Newest Generation of
International Human Rights

(June 1998); The Hart Ctr. (UK), Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, http://
www.hartcentre.demon.co.uk/udhr.htm (last modified Sept. 1998)); UNESCO, SYMPOSIUM ON NEW HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE RIGHTS OF SOLIDARITY, MEXICO CITY, 1980 at 3, UNESCO Doc. 55.81/CONF.806/4
(1981); International Council on Human Rights Policy, TAKING DUTIES SERIOUSLY: INDIVIDUAL DUTIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15–18 (1999); Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, U.N. Comm'n on
Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/63 (2000) ; UN Economic and Social Council, Decision
2001/285 (24 July 2001); Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17; The Individual’s Duties to the Community and the
Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, report
of the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1982) (hereinafter “Report of SR
Daes”).
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a. Explaining Third Generation Solidarity Rights
Human rights law has historically placed a strong emphasis on the individual, leading Professors
Henry Steiner and Philip Alston to conclude in their authoritative text on human rights that “[o]bservers
from different regions and cultures can agree that the human rights movement … stems principally from
the liberal tradition of Western thought … [and n]o characteristic of the liberal tradition is more striking
than its emphasis on the individual.”21 Amidst a historical tradition recognizing “first generation” civil
and political rights of individuals,22 and “second generation” economic, social, and cultural rights of
individuals,23 it is only recently that the human rights discourse has been enriched, developing a language
of social solidarity containing individual duties alongside individual rights, an international legal
language which combines rights and duties, as opposed to its predecessors in Western political theory and
philosophy.24

21

STEINER & ALSTON,supra note 1, at 361-62.
The “first generation” rights were/are the civil and political rights, such as “freedom from slavery, torture, the
right to recognition and equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the guarantee of fair criminal
procedures, and respect for rights of worship and expression.” DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 95-96 (2001).
23
The “second generation” rights were/are the economic, social, and cultural rights, including “the right to work, to
rest and leisure, to education, and to participation in cultural life.” BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 96.
24
It would be erroneous and unfair to claim that the co-existence of individual duties and rights is absent from
Western thought altogether. Quite the contrary, it forms a basis of Rousseau’s social contract and is also present in
the writing of Kant, Mill, and Locke. See, e.g., IMMANUAL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (1797, M.J. GREGOR, TRANS., 1964); JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1962)
(1961). I do not mean to argue that the synergy between individual duties and rights is absent from the Western
social and philosophical discourse, but rather that it has not been codified in the international human rights legal
discourse as it has been in Islamic law. Some would even dispute this claim. Professor Philippa Strum argues, for
example, that “the idea of individual responsibility to the community is central to rights and contract theory as
articulated in the Western tradition, and that both responsibility and rights are implicit in the international version of
the social-contract theory that currently illuminates international law” (emphasis added). Philippa Strum, Rights,
Responsibilities, and the Social Contract, in INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE
FUTURE 29 (KENNETH W. HUNTER & TIMOTHY C. MACK, EDS., 1996) (hereinafter “RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES”). Strum adopts, however, a theory of social contract in which the individual’s duties to the
community are limited to civic duties such as voting and participating in the political process, a far narrower
conception than the inter-individual duties I am discussing here. Finally, Amitai Etzioni’s recent Communitarian
movement, although arguing forcefully for individual responsibility to the group, does so outside the paradigm of
international human rights law. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).
22
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The so-called “third-generation” human rights,25 emphasize the combined rights and duties of
both individuals and groups.26 Originally developed by Professor Karel Vasak in the early 1980s,27 and
recently re-examined by Carl Wellman in his excellent article on the subject,28 the definition of a third
generation solidarity right has three distinct components. First, they impose joint obligations among
states, as opposed to the mere several obligations of first- and second-generation human rights.29 In other
words, they can only be fulfilled when states and other groups work together. Second, solidarity rights
involve a group right that is unique from and additional to the classic individual right paradigm.30 Third,
whereas the first- and second-generation rights impose obligations primarily upon states, third generation
solidarity rights can “not be realized without the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social scene …
[including] the individual.”31
Thus, third generation human rights expand both the notion of right and that of obligation, from
the smallest social unit (the individual) to the largest group. The notion of right is broadened to
encompass group rights; the notion of obligation broadened to include individual obligations and joint
obligations. Considering this complete cooperation between individuals and groups, Wellman’s term
“solidarity rights” is indeed appropriate. Within this most-recent and least developed category of human
rights, scholars typically include the right to development,32 the right to a healthy environment,33 and the
right to peace,34 but the boundaries of third generation rights have never been fully explored.35 By
examining Islamic notions of third generation solidarity rights, this article is one attempt in this direction.

25

See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States,
32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 48-62 (1982).
26
Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Domocratic Governance in Africa, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1209, 1224-27 (2003)
27
Karel Vasak, Pour une Troisième Génération des Droits de l'Homme in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 837, 839 (CHRISTOPHE
SWINARSKI ED., 1984).
28
Carl Wellman, Solidarity, the Individual, and Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 639 (2000).
29
Id. at 643.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 641-42.
32
Sohn, supra note 25, at 52-56.
33
Wellman, supra note 28, at 645-50.
34
Sohn, supra note 25, at 56-59.

10

b. Defending Third Generation Solidarity Rights
The generational paradigm of human rights in general, and the third generation of human rights in
particular, have been criticized by several commentators, most often from the Western World,36 on
multiple levels.37

These critiques generally fall into one of the following four themes: that such

generational terminology generally implies a preference for certain rights, that third-generation rights are
unnecessary because they can already be protected by the existing generations, that third-generation rights
are useless because they are non-justiciable, and that such aspirational rights threaten the legitimacy of
existing human rights.38 This section will treat, and reject, each in turn.
First, some criticize that the generational terminology generally implies a preference for some
rights over others. Yet, while some of these critics argue that such terminology prefers the earlier
generations, “plac[ing] Europe at the pinnacle of global development,”39 others make the opposite claim
that the word generation “connotes a succeeding generation replacing an older one.”40 The fact that these
critics have not even agreed which rights the generational terminology prefers is good evidence that the
35

For additional treatments of third-generation solidarity rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST
WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES (JAN BERTING ET AL. EDS., 1990); Stephen Marks,
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435 (1981) (suggesting other
potential third generation rights such as the right to food, the right to benefit from or share in the common heritage
of mankind, the right to communicate, the right to humanitarian assistance, the right to the satisfaction of basic
needs, and the right to disarmament); Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 19
(1986); Jack Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(C. BROLMANN ET AL., EDS); Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984); Douglas
Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1991); Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an
Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983); Dueling Fates: Should The International Legal Regime
Accept a Collective or Individual Paradigm to Protect Women’s Rights? 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347 (2002).
36
Cees Flinterman, Three Generations of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 75, 78 (1990).
37
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
607 (1984); Otto, supra note 12,at 38 -39; Sohn, supra note 25, at 62; Wellman, supra note 28, at 649-56;
Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79; Udombana, supra note 26, at 1226-1228; Philip Alston, A Third Generation of
Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law? 29 NETH. INT'L
L. REV. 307 (1982).
38
An additional critique, raised by Cees Flinterman, “relates to the question of general acceptance and
meaningfulness of international human rights in a world of diverse value systems. In this view third-generation
rights are seen primarily as the reflection of the vagaries and pressures of current United Nations policies rather than
of widespread and significant popular demands.” Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79. Because the rest of this article is
based on the notion that third generation rights represent a move towards, not away from, non-Western value
systems, this critique is not treated in this section.
39
Otto, supra note 12, at 38.
40
Sohn, supra note 25, at 62.
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generational terminology does not, in fact, prefer particular rights at all.

Rather than implying a

preference for certain rights over others, the generational terminology represents variations in the balance
between individual and collective rights and duties. These variations are valuable, and I have argued that
a full recognition of them is fundamental to the question of the universality of human rights,41 but this
additional approach in no way effects the important role of previously established and important human
rights.
Second, specific to third-generation rights, the critique is raised that “because the coordinated
action of states is required, given contemporary global interdependence, to secure first- and secondgeneration human rights, … new joint obligations can be derived directly from the existing human rights
of individual persons without the emergence of any additional rights of solidarity.”42 But, this critique
ignores the entire legitimacy concern upon which this article is based, that because efforts to universalize
rights based consistently in Western conceptions of the individual will lack legitimacy in many cultures
and therefore be ineffective, there should be a concurrent dialogue examining other rights paradigms,
such as solidarity rights.43 In the words of An-Na’im, “collective rights as a conceptual category are so
important that the human rights movement is much more weakened by their wholesale exclusion than the
inclusion of some of them.”44
Third, some are critical of the non-justiciable character third generation solidarity rights,45 a
critique also frequently mounted against second-generation rights. This argument is weak for three
reasons. First, proponents of third-generation rights counter that “the existence or recognition of human

41

See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
Wellman, supra note 28, at 651. See also Id. at 652-53 (“If Vasak and other advocates of solidarity rights are
correct in asserting that the human rights of individuals cannot be fully realized in a world of global interdependence
without the efforts of all--or at least many--actors on the social scene, then the human rights of individuals provide
legal sources adequate to justify the imposition of obligations upon a wider range of parties under existing human
rights law.”).
43
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
44
Id. at 16.
45
Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79.
42
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rights should be considered a separate question from the means by which they are enforced.”46 Second, to
the extent that individual duties take precedence over individual rights in the latter generations – as I will
show is the case in Islamic notions of solidarity rights and should be the case in international notions of
these rights – justiciability is, in fact, realistic. Third, it should be considered by many a strength, rather
than a weakness, that the human rights movement has realized that the “legal discourse offers, at best,
limited and precarious tools for transformative challenge.”47 In fact, in her study on the universality of
human rights, Professor Dianne Otto cites “resisting legal imperialism” as one of the five essential
requirements to her transformational, post-structural approach to universality, stating that “we must be
careful that the discourse of rights does not silence other languages--of needs, obligations, community,
empowerment, ethics, economic justice, and material equity. These extralegal, local languages may have
been what Foucault meant when he suggested we turn to the possibility of a new form of
‘antidisciplinary’ right.”48
Fourth, and related, some argue that because third generation rights “cannot realistically be
satisfied at present and are not readily susceptible to legal codification, … [they move] the entire human
rights idea to the level of utopian aspiration, to which governments need to feel little present
obligation.”49 From a positivist legal standpoint, there is little substance to the argument that new rights
could harm the implementation of old rights, because obligations in human rights law are highly
disaggregated, with each State’s obligations being a function of its ratifications and reservations to the
existing human rights treaties. Any non-binding codification of third generation rights would have no
consequence on State obligations under the existing binding human rights treaty mechanisms, the latter
obligations being specific and rooted in the elaboration of rights developed by the relevant treaty body.
46

Id. at 78. See also An-Na’im, supra note 11, at 14 (“[T]here is a circular logic in saying that since collective
rights cannot satisfy the exact justiciability requirements of individual rights, they cannot possibly qualify as human
rights.”).
47
Otto, supra note 12, at 42.
48
Id. at 43 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 108 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980)).
49
Id. at 79. See also Sohn, supra note 25, at 62 (“It has also been said that claims for new rights distort the meaning
of human rights ‘by pretending that all objects of human desire are 'rights' which can be had, if not for the asking
then at least for the demanding,’ especially if one talks of such ‘rights’ as rights ‘to a happy childhood, to selffulfillment, to development.’”) (citing Kirkpatrick, Double Standards in Human Rights 2, 2 (Dep't of State Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Current Policy No. 353, Nov. 24, 1981)).
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The argument is also questionable from the perspective of legal history: Human rights law specifically,50
and international law generally,51 has always been marked by a progressive codification process,
beginning with non-binding declarations and progressing towards binding obligations when and if support
exists in the international community. Professor Sohn notes that “Like the economic, social, and cultural
rights, the new rights, even if not immediately attainable, establish new goals that can be achieved
progressively, by one laborious step after another.”52
Rather than mere utopian aspirations, third generation solidarity rights are in the words of Paul de
Waart “the pivot on which both human rights and rights of state hinge.”53 In this regard, Flinterman notes
that the right to development “works as a corrective to the direction of development, …concerned with
the quality of development … [and making] individual development its ultimate goal.”54 Similarly,
Vasak argues that general protection of the environment is useless, “if one does not start from the basic
right [and, I might add, duty] of the individual to a clean and balanced environment.”55 Third generation
rights, according to Vasak, “infuse the human dimension into areas where it has all too often been missing
having been left to the State or States."56 Furthermore, their acceptance may go a long way towards
solving the universality question in the international human rights movement. The critiques outlined in
this section can largely be distilled into an over-all fear that acceptance of solidarity rights will threaten
50

The modern international human rights movement was born with a non-binding declaration, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was later codified as two binding Covenants, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. See STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 1, at 138-41.
51
Customary International Law is grounded in the assumption that non-binding declarations and other opinio juris
become binding customary international law if they are consistently followed by States “out of a sense of legal
obligation.” BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 14-24; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-126
(2001). See, e.g. Hurst Hannun, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287
(describing how the Declaration has been utilized by a number of U.S. courts as evidence of the content of
customary international human rights law).
52
Sohn, supra note 25, at 63-64. See also Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance:
The Case of Collective Rights, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that “the recognition of collective rights as human rights
should neither be at the expense of the protection of individual human rights, nor confined to the conceptual and
implementation framework of these rights.”).
53
Flinterman, supra note 36, at 77.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 78.
56
Lecture by Karel Vasak, Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights (July 1979), as
quoted in Marks, supra note 35, at 441.
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existing individual rights. This fear should be taken for what it is – an effort to keep the human rights
movement Western-centric – and disregarded.

c. The De-emphasized “Individual Duty” Variable in Third
Generation Solidarity Rights
As explained above, Wellman’s three-pronged definition of third-generation solidarity rights
emphasizes their role both as group rights (the second prong) and as individual duties (the third prong).57
Although this is the case, the prevailing western conception of these rights focuses almost exclusively on
the “group right” component, rarely mentioning the “individual duty” component.58 This reluctance to
acknowledge the role of individual duties in third generation human rights is consistent with a longstanding reticence in international law to codify individual duties in international instruments.59 As
57

Supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
For a lengthy characterization of solidarity rights as “group rights,” see Koo VanderWal, Collective Human
Rights: A Western View, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND
COLLECTIVITIES (hereinafter “INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES”) 83 (1990). See also Jack Donnelly,
Human rights, Individual Rights and collective Rights, in INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES, supra, at 39,
43-54; Peter R. Baehr, Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, in INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES, supra, at
99; Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 461, 470-72 (1995). In another
work, my argument that affirmative action be classified as a third generation group right was, similarly, based on its
“group right” component. See Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond: A
Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 Wash. & Lee R.E.A.L. J. 73 (2003) (arguing that
“as a human right, affirmative action [is] … a positive duty on a government and it protects group rights”). See also
Louise Mulder, How Positive can Equality Measures Be? in NON-DISCIRIMINATION LAW: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 65 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999) (arguing that, by its very nature, affirmative
action represents some willingness to acknowledge group rights no matter what the jurisdiction). Even when AnNa’im follows a reverse moderate relativist approach and discusses the potential universality of collective rights, he
treats these rights almost exclusively from the “group right” and not “individual duty” perspective. See Abdullahi
A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance: The Case of Collective Rights, supra note 11.
59
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 323 (noting that a “fundamental characteristic of the UDHR and ICCPR
[is] their foundation in the rhetoric and concept of rights”). See also UDHR, supra note 7 (completely framed as
rights with the exception of article 29); ICCPR, supra note 7 (completely framed as rights except one pre-ambular
reference to duties); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereinafter “ICESCR”) Dec.
16, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (completely framed as rights except one pre-ambular
reference to duties); Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (fifty references to rights and no references to duties);
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965 (entered into force Jan. 4,
1969), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (forty-five references to rights and no references to duties); Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into
force June 26, 1987) (fifteen references to rights and only one reference to duties (Art. 10)); Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). (seventy-six references to
rights and three references to duties (Arts. 3, 5, 14)). But see Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human
Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 588-91 (arguing that “the
58
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Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes made clear in her exhaustive, 8-year study on the individual’s duty
to the community under Art. 29 of the UDHR (the soul duties provision of that instrument),60 the debate
over duties in the drafting of the UDHR was long and protracted: Although “it was emphasized that it
was not possible to draw up a declaration of rights without proclaiming the duties implicit in the concept
of freedom which made it possible to set up a peaceful and democratic society,”61 the numerous attempts
to enumerate such duties could never find agreement,62 and the weak and undefined general duty of the
individual under article 29 is all that emerged.63 The reference to duties in the pre-ambular paragraphs of
the ICCPR and the ICESCR is the similarly insignificant result of an equally protracted debate.64
Controversy surrounding the concept of international duties has been rekindled in response to the
international duties movement of the late 1990s,65 particularly the proposed draft Universal Declaration of
Human Responsibilities written by the Inter-Action Council for possible adoption by the UN General
Assembly on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998.66 Because of

recognition of concepts of duty in Western legal theory carries over into an express recognition of duties in
international human rights instruments”). Saul is incorrect, basing this broad assertion on article 29 of the UDHR
and the mere pre-ambular references in the ICCPR and ICESCR. Compare Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17,
at 6 (“There is quite clearly a sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the very extensive bibliographical materials
published on the subject of human rights, the enormous conceptual advances made in this respect and the variety of
practical actions which human rights and fundamental freedoms have already warranted, and, on the other, the lack
of precise formal definitions concerning what duties arise for each individual under article 29, paragraph 1, of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the last paragraph of the common preamble to the International
Covenants on Human Rights”). Nevertheless, Saul’s overall thesis, arguing against a “superfluous and potentially
damaging human responsibilities treaty,” Saul, supra at 617, is consistent with my argument here that there has been
a historical reticence to codify individual duties in international instruments.
60
See Report of SR Daes, supra note 20.
61
Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at para. 29 (cited in cited in Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12 para.
47).
62
SR Daes cites several proposed formulations, none of which were approved. Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at
paras. 11, 13, 14, 15 and 17 (cited in Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 26 fn. 22.
63
Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12, para. 48 (There appears to have been no difficulty at the time in
recognizing that individuals had duties/responsibilities to their social environment but, despite the various
formulations proposed (some withdrawn, others rejected after a vote) to arrive at precise wordings in this respect,
the Committee finally adopted - by 35 votes to none, with 6 abstentions - the generic text which now stands as
article 29, paragraph 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). Article 29 states: “Everyone has duties to
the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.” UDHR, supra note 7, at
Art. 29(1).
64
Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12, paras. 49-52 (citing Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at paras. 4863).
65
Saul, supra note 20, at 566-78. The various declarations proposed by the Human Responsibilities Movement are
cited supra note 20.
66
Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 22 ¶ 112.

16

the harsh criticism of the draft declaration by leading scholars, such as Theodore Van Boven,67 and
human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International,68 the International Commission of Jurists, and
others,69 plans to present the draft for adoption by the UN GA were tabled.70 As explained by Ben Saul in
his article critical of the international duties movement:
The human rights movement originated in struggles against traditional forms of duty
towards the church, feudal lords, and the monarchy. As these struggles were slowly won,
new forms of duty and obligation arose against which the human rights movement
continued to struggle: the exclusions, hypocrisies, and omissions in the early human
rights movement; the emergence of ethnic nationalism; the growth of industrial economic
dependence; and colonial and patriarchal domination. While the human rights movement
frequently betrayed its ideals or framed its original ideals in exclusionary terms, over
time the movement has adapted its tactics and refocused its resistance against new forms
of oppressive duty and obligation. In doing so, human rights advocates have vigilantly
learned to treat the language of duty and obligation with deep and well-justified
suspicion.71
Essentially, human rights advocates are concerned that duties will be overpowering rather than
complementary to rights, that they will be used as an alternative force for evil, rather than as an additional
force for good. Yet, even Saul recognizes the element of duty present in the third generation solidarity
right to a healthy environment, noting the “individual ‘responsibility to protect and improve the
environment’” in the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment.72 This is a step in the right direction, because it finds an acceptable place for duties not
complementary or additional to rights, but within the definition of a specific class of rights. By narrowing

67

See generally Theodore Van Boven, A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities? in REFLECTIONS ON
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 73
(1998). See also Saul, supra note 20.
68
Amnesty Int'l, Muddying the Waters: The Draft "Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities" - No
Complement to Human Rights (1998), online at http://www.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/IOR400021998 (discussed in
Saul, supra note 20, at 604-07).
69
Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 30, fn. 52 (listing specifically Amnesty International, the Carter Centre,
the International Commission of Jurists and the International Federation of Human Rights) (citing the annual reports
to the Commission on Human Rights working group on the draft declaration on the right and responsibility of
individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and
fundamental freedoms.UN Docs. E/CN.4/1993/64, E/CN.4/1994/81, E/CN.4/1995/93, E/CN.4/1995/93,
E/CN.4/1996/97, E/CN.4/1997/92 and E/CN.4/1998/98).
70
Saul, supra note 20, at 578.
71
Id. at 616.
72
Id. at 598-99 (citing the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev.1 at 3, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)).
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this place for duties so significantly, the fears of Amnesty international,73 Saul,74 and Van Boven,75 will
be kept at bay, and duties can become a useful component of, rather than a nebulous or even dangerous
alternative to, international human rights.
Thus, rather than a wholesale replacement of human rights by human duties, or even a human
responsibilities movement which emphasizes the need for individual duties separate and complementary
to human rights, duties can best be incorporated into human rights law by recognizing their place in third
generation solidarity rights. Consequently, the de-emphasis of the role of individual duties in third
generation solidarity rights is harmful not only for distorting the true nature of these rights, but also
because it denies an acceptable place for duties within human rights, a place where duties do not
overpower all rights but rather are integral to the definition of certain rights. Reverse moderate relativism
provides a tool to correct this de-emphasis: By looking to Islamic law, where individual duty to the group
is emphasized, this article will attempt to expand the international understanding of individual duty as a
component of third-generation solidarity rights.

73

Amnesty Int'l, Muddying the Waters: The Draft "Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities" - No
Complement to Human Rights, supra note 68.
74
Saul, supra note 20, at 602 (“Clearly, there is a danger that codifying responsibilities may intrude arbitrarily and
selectively into delicate codes of local human morality, disturbing organic balances that have developed over
time.”); Id. at 607-08 ("[T]hose in power [in West-ern and non-Western contexts] have used the language of duty
and obligation to suppress human rights" (citing position of International Council on Human Rights Policy, stated at
Jan Bauer, Report on United Nations Commission on Human Rights 55th Session, online at
http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/unchr99/report4.shtml#human (July 23, 1999)); Id. at 608 (“Notions of individual duty
may be transformed by political authorities into demands for blind and uncritical patriotism.”); Id. (“The fear has
been expressed, for example, that some Asian governments may ‘readily embrace the concept of human
responsibilities as a substitute for the advancement of human rights,’ particularly since Malaysian Prime Minister
Dr. Mahatir Mohammed has called for a review of the text of the UDHR” (citing Inter-Action Council, Summary
Report of the Steering Committee Meeting on the Dissemination of the Universal Declaration of Human
Responsibilities, http://www.asia wide.or.jp/iac/Meetings/Eng98frankfurt.htm (Mar. 20-21, 1998); Joint Standing
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade, Austl. Parliament, Improving But ... ; Australia's Regional Dialogue
on Human Rights, http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/dialog/reportinx.htm (1998)); Id. at 610
(“European history is littered with the bodies of desperate, rebelling peasants who sought relief from, or the
moderation of, oppressive duties.”); Id. at 613 (“The harnessing of duty for the glory of the territorially expansionist
State was a bloody feature of European imperialism and foreign colonization, most glaringly in the British conquest
of Africa and India. It was also an effective method of rallying patriotism: duty to God, King/Emperor, and Country
was the ubiquitous leitmotif of First and Second World War propaganda.”) (citations omitted).
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III.

Social Solidarity: A Muslim Duty
The first Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human rights and human

Responsibilities, Mr. Miguel Alfosno Martínez, has already begun using the technique of reverse
moderate relativism by looking to teachings of the world’s religions to better understand the relationship
between human rights and human responsibilities instead of limiting his research to international law.76
Unfortunately, despite the paramount importance of duties in Islam, this initial investigation by the
Special Rapporteur was limited to “the tenets of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church.”77 This is a
true disadvantage, because the importance of responsibility in Islam is fundamental. As explained by
Marcel A. Boisard :
Islam offers a unifying and integrated vision of humankind, of society, and of the world.
In this framework, individual duties trump individual rights. Social virtue is
preeminently collective rather than inter-individual. The Western notion of individual
self-interest as the antithesis of general welfare is thus theoretically absent in Islamic
social thought.”78
This Islamic emphasis on duties over rights is so pronounced that one scholar characterized
Islamic law as “an endless discussion on the duties of a Muslim.”79

Consistent with Wellman’s

definition of third-generation international human rights,80 this Islamic notion of social improvement is a
combined effort, whereby “[i]ndividuals, communities and indeed the state, act as the instruments by
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Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapportuer
appointed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to undertake the study
requested by the Commission in its resolution 2000/63, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/107, at 19-21 (19 Mar. 2002).
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(describing the importance of duties in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam).
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Marcel A. Boisard, Existe-t-il une Conception Islamique Spécifique des Droits de l’Homme ? in ISLAM &
DROITS DE L’HOMME 131, 132-33 (Emmanuel Hirsch, ed., 1984) (« L’Islam offre une vision unicitaire et intégré
de l’homme, de la société et du monde. … Dans cette optique, le devoir de l’individu prime son droit. La qualité
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occidentale opposant l’intérêt individuel au bien commun est donc théoriquement absente de la pensée sociale
islamique. ») (translation by the author). See also Id. at 132 (« l’Islam … propose … un humanisme balancé qui
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RAHMAN, supra note 8, at 32.
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which these ideals are translated into practice.”81 But, although Wellman’s three-pronged definition of
third-generation solidarity rights includes both duties and rights for the individual and the group, the
prevailing western conception of these rights focuses on the “group right” component, rarely mentioning
the “individual duty” component.82
In Islam, by contrast, social solidarity is rooted in the importance of individual duty to the group
(ummah), as has been clarified in several declarations on Islam and human rights. First, the Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, emphasizes individual and collective responsibility in its
preamble and cites human duties in Articles 1 (non-discrimination), 2 (right to life), 6 (equality of the
sexes), 8 (legal capacity), and 9 (education).83 The Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,
composed of five principles, dedicates one of them to the importance of individual duties.84

The

Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights states in its preamble that “duties and obligations have
priority over … rights”85 and concludes with an explanatory note that “[e]ach one of the Human Rights
enunciated in this declaration carries a corresponding duty.”86 By expanding on the concept of individual
duties in Islamic law in this Part, and then exploring Islamic conceptions of third generation solidarity
rights in the next Part, this article aims to enrich the international understanding of individual duty as a
component of third-generation solidarity rights using Islamic law as its guide.

a. Islamic Bases for Individual Duties
In Islamic law, individual duties are particularly prominent and immutable because of their
religious foundation. Dr. Adbulaziz Othman Altwaijri emphasizes that:

81

Nanji, supra note 182, at 346.
See supra note II(C).
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Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Arts. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign
Ministers, UN Doc: ST/HR/1/Rev.5 (Vol. II) (Aug. 5, 1990) (hereinafter “Cairo Declaration”)).
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Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, World Syposium on Human Rights in Islam (Feb. 27, 2000),
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Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights, Preamble (Paris, Sept. 19, 1981)
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emphasized by numerous commentators. See MAYER, supra note 14, at 59-65.
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[H]uman rights in Islam are Allah’s rights and should be observed and exercised in the
best manner possible, in order to achieve purity of worship, total subjugation and
obedience to the Almighty, and full compliance with His Teachings. The Islamic concept
of human rights thus ascends to the sublime status of an act of worship, these rights being
in Islamic Sharia no less than religious duties. This degree of obligation to obey the law
(taklif) lays a heavy responsibility on the human being vis-à-vis Allah, himself, the
community and humanity as a whole.87
This religious weight, Dr. Alwaijri argues, makes individual responsibility “the cornerstone that
upholds Muslim society.”88 In contrast to mere constitutional or political rights schemes, individual
duties “are not the intellectual result of a phase in the development of the human mind, nor are they
natural rights as stipulated in organic laws. They are, in fact, duties of the faith, entrusted to the
individual and the society; each within their domain and depending on their degree of responsibility.”89
Similarly, Professor Fazlur Rahman of the University of Chicago argues that “[j]ust as in Kantian terms
no ideal knowledge is possible without the regulative ideas of reason …, so in Qur’anic terms no real
morality is possible without the regulative ideas of God and the Last Judgment. Further, their very moral
function requires that they exist for religiomoral experience and cannot be mere intellectual postulates to
be ‘believed in.’”90 In fact, the sense of obligation created is so strong, that several Islamic scholars prefer
the term “human necessities” to human rights.91 Under Islamic law, the sovereign is Allah, “the absolute
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In his book, aptly titled Islam and Human Rights: Requisite Necessities rather than Mere Rights, Dr. Muhammad
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arbiter of values,”92 and “[t]he sovereignty of the people, if the use of the word ‘sovereignty’ is at all
appropriate, is a delegated, or executive sovereignty (sultan tanfidhi) only.”93 A full examination of the
bases for this sense of individual obligation under Islamic law, which literally permeates the entire Qur’an
and Sunna, is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, two specific manifestations deserve special
mention: the doctrine of vicegerency and amanah (trust).
The doctrine of vicegerency,94 -- variously translated as the human role as steward,95 deputy,96 or
viceroy97 of God – is rooted in The Holy Qur’an Heifer 3098 and significantly enhances the importance of
human duties. In this role as vicegerent of God, “the Muslim community is entrusted with the authority
to implement the Shari’ah, to administer justice and to take all necessary measures in the interest of good
government.”99 Nanji notes that “[t]he concept of custodial trusteeship, expressed in the Qur’an through
the notion of the individual’s role as khalifah – stewardship – and hence accountability for the way in

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 92 (A. POLLIS & P. SCHWAB, EDS., 1980).(“[H]uman rights [in Islam] exist
only in relation to human obligations. Individuals possess certain obligations toward God, fellow humans, and
nature, all of which are defined in the Shariah. When individuals meet these obligations they acquire certain rights
and freedoms which are again prescribed by the Shariah. Those who do not accept these obligations have no rights,
and any claims of freedom that they make upon society lack justicification.”) (cited in Arzt, supra note 6, at 205-06.
92
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1991).
93
Id. (citing ADB AL-KARIM ZAYDAN, AL FARD WA’L-DAWLAH FI’L-SHARI’AH AL-ISLAMIYYAH,2ND
ED. 29 (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1970). See also HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6,
at 57:2 (“It is He that has sovereighnty over the heavens and the earth. He ordains life and death, and has power
over all things.”).
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celebrate Thy praises And glorify Thy holy (name)?’ He said: ‘I know what ye know not.’”). See also Id. at 6:165
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Qur’an. Abraham, An Ecological Reading of the Qur’anic Understanding of Creation, BANGALORE
THEOLOGICAL FORUM, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (2001), online at www.religion-online.org/cgibin/relsearchd.dll/showarticle?item_id=1632 (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 38:26:10:14; 2:30;
7:69:7:74; 6:165; 2:255; 7:169).
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which such a role is undertaken for the betterment of society, and for future generations” exemplifies the
importance the Qur’an places on individual duty to the group.”100
Although many contemporary Muslim thinkers, both reformist and Islamist,101 subscribe to the
doctrine of vicegerency, including Abd-al-Hamid, Muhammad Iqbal, Mustansir Mir, George Koovackal,
Safia Anbir, Seyyed Hossien Nasr, Al-Birnni, and Soumaya Pernilla Ouis,102 others argue that it is based
on a misinterpretation of the term khalifah in the Qur’an 2:30.103 For these latter scholars, the doctrine of
vicegerency would imply that Allah is not present today, an untenable position for Muslims. In my view,
the correct interpretation is that of the former scholars, that “[h]uman beings are vicegerents of God not in
the sense that they succeed and replace God, [but rather] … because God subjected (sakhkhara)
everything to us and gifted us with free will, knowledge and a bias towards doing good.”104 This general
interpretation is preferable, because even those who discount the doctrine of vicegerency as the legal basis
for individual duties in Islamic law cannot possibly deny the existence of such duties. It is to other
potential bases for individual duties that I know turn.
In addition, or in the alternative, individual duties to Allah and to the Ummah are rooted in the
amanah (trust) which Allah has placed in each individual as described in Al-Ahzab 72-73: “We offered
100

Nanji, supra note 182, at 346 (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 2:30). See also Nanji, supra, at 353
(“The new boundary within which such an integrated vision would operate for Muslims was in a moral community
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Our trust to the heavens, to the earth, and to the mountains, but they refused the burden and were afraid to
receive it. Man undertook to bear it, but he has proved a sinner and a fool.”105 By accepting this trust,
humans have accepted individual responsibility towards each other and toward the whole of society.106
The second part of the sura represents two major obstacles (sin and foolishness) to the accomplishment of
this mission.107

This trust is also represented in Al-A’Raf 172. After discussing the individual duty to

“strictly observe” Islamic law,108 this sura states: “Your Lord brought forth descendants from the loins of
Adam’s children, and made them testify against themselves. He said: ‘Am I not your Lord?’ They
replied: ‘We bear witness that You are.’ This He did, lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection:
‘We had no knowledge of that,’ or: ‘Our forefathers were, indeed, idolaters; but will You destroy us,
their descendants, on account of what the followers of falsehood did?”109 In this Sura, the potential to
exonerate individual duty is completely eliminated: Not only are humans prevented, through this solemn
vow, from claiming they were not informed of their duties by Allah, but they also cannot place the burden
on their parents.
Still other scholars find a basis for individual duties in Al-Isra 70: “We have bestowed blessings
on Adam’s children and guided them by land and sea. We have provided them with wholesome things
and exalted them above many of our creatures.”110 Professor Idriss Alaoui Al Abdallaoui explains that
one of the preferred explanations for this preferred status over other creatures is the human ability to think
and reason, finding in this a duty to use it for good.111
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Thus, even in this brief presentation of some of the most basic themes, it is clear that the bases for
an Islamic emphasis on individual duties in the Qur’an and Sunna is extremely rich. Rather than debating
where, exactly, this emphasis on duties originates, it is far more useful to acknowledge the combined
effect of the aggregate of such justifications. As such, it is incontestable that the notion of individual
duties in Islamic law carries great importance. After further examining the complexity of Islamic duties
in the next sub-sections, Part IV will examine how this Islamic emphasis on duties changes notions of
third generation international human rights.

b. Islamic Language of Duties
Because duties are so central to Islamic belief and practice, a language and structure of duties has
developed in Islamic law which is far more complex than the simple references to duties seen in the
international human rights movement.112 Islamic law is a “comprehensive social blueprint” for all actions
of Muslims, most of which are framed as duties.113 These hukm Shari’a (commands of the lawgiver
concerning the duties of Muslims) fall into five “well known categories of wajib (obligatory), mandub
(recommended), haram (forbidden), makruh (abominable) and mubah (permissible).”114 The importance
of duties in this system is unquestionable: Islamic law determines a person’s duties in every potential
situation using these al-ahkam al-khamsa (“five qualifications”).115 These categorical divisions are highly
complex, the subject of many multi-volume treatises on Islamic law, most of which have never been
translated from Arabic,116 and a full examination of this subject far exceeds the scope of this article.
Rather than explain the complex categorization of duties in Islam, a task that should only be undertaken
by a qualified Islamic legal scholar (‘ulm or imam), this section aims simply to emphasize the point that
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duties are important in Islamic law. At the risk that my over-simplified summary will make the opposite
point, I provide below several common subdivisions of the Islamic conception of individual duty, in an
effort to show its importance and complexity in Islamic jurisprudence.

1. Wajib and Fard
One place in which the complexity of the language of duties can be seen in Islamic law is the
distinction between wajib and fard, both of which would translate into English merely as “duty.”117
Although many Islamic scholars view wajib and fard as synonymous,118 “[t]he Hanafis have, however,
drawn a distinction between [them]. An act is thus obligatory in the first degree, that is, fard, when the
command to do it is conveyed in a clear and definitive text of the Qur’an or Sunnah. But if the command
to do something is established in a speculative (zanni) authority, such as an Ahad Hadith, the act would be
obligatory in the second degree (Wajib).”119 This distinction is important, according to Islamic jurists,
because disobeying a fard makes one a disbeliever, whereas one is only a transgressor if one contests the
authority of a wajib.120 According to some, the distinction is also important because disregarding a fard
nullifies an act, while disregarding a wajib merely weakens it. For example, a prayer without obligatory
bowing or prostration is void, but without recitation of al-Fatihah it is merely deficient.121

2. Ayn and Kifaya
As a point of comparison to third generation solidarity rights in international human rights law,
the division of Islamic duties into Ayn and Kifaya is highly significant. Ayn duties (wajib ayni or fard
ayni) are individual duties incumbant upon all Muslims because of their religious and social significance,
such as ritual prayer, fasting,122 fulfillment of contracts, obedience to one’s parents,123 and the duty to
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understand certain religious rules.124

Kifaya duties, on the other hand, are collective duties, “the

fulfillment of which by a sufficient number of individuals excuses the other individuals [of the ummah]
from fulfilling” them.125 Examples of fard kifaya include funeral prayer, jihad (holy struggle), hisbah
(the promotion of good and prevention of evil), giving testimony and serving as a judge, building
hospitals, extinguishing fires,126 and acquiring Ilm al-Deen (full religious knowledge).127 Because not
everyone is capable of acquiring full knowledge of Islam, and not everyone has the means to meet the
cost of a burial when someone dies or to build a hospital, these duties are kifaya (collective). But, for
those who have the means, the collective obligation becomes their personal obligation – the fard kifaya
becomes fard ayn.128

3. Muwaqqat and Mutlaq
Islam also divides duty into muwaqqat (contingent on a time limit) and mutlaq (absolute, that is,
free of time limit).129 Examples of the former include fasting and obligatory prayers, because there is a
specific time in which they are to be performed. On the other hand, the hajj pilgrimage is an example of a
mutlaq duty, since it can be performed at any time during one’s life. Payment of kaffarah (expiation) also
fits into this latter category. Other mutlaq duties are absolute in the sense that, every time the relevant
124
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occasion arrises, the duty must be fulfilled, such as the duty to obey one’s parents and to carry out hisbah
(promoting good and preventing evil).130

4. Muhaddad and Ghayr Muhaddad
Finally, there is also a division in Islamic law between muhaddad (quantified) duties and ghayr
muhaddad (unquantified) duties.131 The former include zakah, salah, payment by the purchaser in a sales
transaction, payment of a specific rent in a tenancy agreement, and payment of hudud (penalties), all of
which are quantified and specific.132 Unquantified duties, on the other hand, include the duty to “give
charity to the needy not in time of zakat, to feed the hungry not in time of feeding, when the person
responsible has to do penance, to do justice, benovelence [sic] and economy in expending, abstinence, to
help the sorrowful and the grieved, and all similar duties to which the legislator has not fixed a
determined value because they are meant to meet the needs of the people.”133 Because ghayr muhaddad
duties are unquantified specifically because they are meant to meet social demand, they exemplify
particularly well the social solidarity goal inherent in Islamic duties. Although in a more subtle way, even
muhaddad duties have a strong social solidarity component, because they are embedded with ghayr
muhaddad duties, as determined by the capacity of the individual. For example, “the school master, the
university teacher, after they have finished their duties and works required from them in exchange for a
salary, … should provide scientific and intellectual assistance to whoesoever [sic] is in need of it. …
within the limits of their possibilities.”134 Similarly, a wealthy Muslim upon paying zakat (a determined
duty), must then evaluate his or her means combined with the needs of those around to determine if
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additional material help is required (an undetermined duty).135 In this way, the end result of both
muhaddad and ghayr muhaddad duties is meeting social need to the highest extent possible.

c. Additional Aspects of Duties in Islam
In several other ways, the discourse surrounding duties in Islam is complex. First, Islam has
recognized the distinction between positive and negative duties,136 much as the human rights movement
recognizes the distinction between positive and negative rights.137 Second, just as human rights scholars
analyze conflicts between two rights, noting that one individual’s right only extends as far as the
encroachment of the rights of another individual,138 Islam carries out the same analysis in the context of
duties. Using the example of a society in need of 10,000 doctors which has 30,000 doctors, Dounmez
argues that a society where too many people are meeting a fard kifaya (collective duty) has done no better
in meeting the collective duty than a society where too few are meeting the duty. Analyzing the issue “in
light of the aim of the collective duty,” Dounmez concludes that “the collective duty is not realized,
[because] … the limit expected is surpassed on account of another collective duty.”139 Thus, just as
human rights scholars limit an individual right partly based on its potential to encroach other rights of
other individuals, Islamic legal scholars limit duties based on their potential to encroach upon other
individual duties to society. The notable difference is in the effect: whereas the focus in the human rights
analysis resolves a conflict of one individual against another, the Islamic duties analysis attempts to
maximize two simultaneous attempts at societal improvement.
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d. Conclusion
Thus, Islamic law is characterized by a pronounced emphasis on duties over rights, which now
forms part of a complex language, theology, philosophy, and law of duties. Beginning with a discussion
of several religious bases for the emphasis on individual duty, this Part has outlined several of the ways
Islamic thinkers have divided the concept of duty. Any effort at brief summary of this vast world of
duties, which has intrigued Islamic scholars for over a millennium, would be ipso facto deficient, but a
notion of the importance of duties in Islamic law is critical to the greater goal of this article, analysis of
Islamic notions of third generation solidarity rights. By providing an overview of four ways that duty in
Islamic law is commonly divided, this section has aimed not to fully examine these divisions, but rather to
argue that the mere presence of such divisions speaks to the importance of duties in the Islamic tradition.
This Part concluded by discussing other areas where duties language in Islam is highly developed,
paralleling rights language in international human rights law.

Having established the paramount

importance of individual duties in Islamic law, the next Part will examine its effect on Islamic notions of
third generation solidarity rights.

IV.

Third Generation International Human Rights: An
Islamic Perspective

At least a decade before Vasak made his famous “discovery” of third-generation human rights, a
group of eminent jurists from Saudi Arabia described the concept in almost identical terms in their efforts
to explain Islamic conceptions of human rights at The Vatican Colloquium on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights in Islam.140 In their concluding observations, they stated:
“We note that cultural rights as codified in the international conventions are personal and
subjective rights, not general and imperative duties. We further note that these rights are
framed in ‘negative’ terms only. … [In contrast,] cultural rights in Islam have an
140
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obligatory character that cannot be renounced, contrary to the international conception
which considers them as a personal and discretionary right which can be renounced by
the beneficiary. They are both individual and collective obligations, the execution of
which is incumbent on both the individual and the collectivity.”141
Although made in the context of economic, social and cultural rights, what these comments really
describe are third generation solidarity rights in Islam, with an emphasis on the sharing of individual and
collective duty. Whereas third generation solidarity rights are weak and aspirational in the international
legal discourse, these Saudi jurists cite them as a basic principle in the Islamic notion of human rights,
discussing them prior to their “discovery” by the international human rights movement. Just as Wellman
expounds three decades later, these scholars emphasized the importance of coexisting individual and
collective obligations that is characteristic of third generation solidarity rights. Because of these parallels
between the conceptions of Islam and the foundations of solidarity rights, it should come as no surprise
that strong support exists for the three most-commonly proposed solidarity rights – the right to a healthy
environment, the right to development, and the right to peace – in the Islamic tradition. This Part will
examine each area in detail.

a. Right to a Healthy Environment
As discussed by Wellman,142 a growing number of international conventions in the past twenty
years have attempted to codify a right to a healthy environment, such as the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment in 1972,143 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981,144 the United
Nations World Charter for Nature in 1982,145 and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
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Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988.146 Against these recent
developments on the international level, a right and duty towards environmental protection have existed
in Islam since the time of the Prophet Mohammed,147 present in both the Qur’an and the Sunna. This
section will analyze some of the bases for environmental protection in Islam.
The environment is discussed in numerous verses of the Qur’an,148 a common characteristic of
these being the view that “the concept of the environment is broad and is used in many different ways,”149
including the natural environment,150 the social environment,151 and the economic environment.152 The
Qur’an states generally: “Seek not (occasions for) mischief in the land.”153 This general notion of
environmental protection manifests itself in several specific areas. First, in the area of pollution, the
Prophet Mohammed stated “[n]o one shall urinate on stagnant water, [and] avoid the abhorrent act of
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emptying your bowels near water sources, in the middle of the road, and in the shade.”154 Al-Khayyat
notes that “[w]hat is striking in these commands is the use of the word ‘la’n’ (curse) or one of its
derivatives. ‘La’n’ entails exclusion, repudiation, and banishment from the community. The implications
are evident: he who deliberately pollutes the environment to the detriment of the community becomes
liable to banishment.”155 The use of such strong language reinforces the importance of environmentalism
in the Islamic tradition.156

Second, Islam takes a definite stand in the area of water conservation. The

Prophet Mohammed forbid excessive use of water, even for cleaning or ablutions, setting the example
himself by bathing in a ‘sa’’ (two liters) of water and performing ablutions with half a liter.157 According
to Imam Ab ‘Ubeid in his Kitab at-Tuhur, the Prophet also returned unused clean water to the river after
ablutions, stating “Let (this water) reach a human, an animal, or any living creature so that they may, by
the Grace of Allah, benefit from it.”158 The Qur’an also states: “Waste not through excess, for God does
not love the wasteful.”159 Third, Islam takes a stand on preservation of other natural resources, such as
plants and animals. Imam Muhammad bin Hazm stated in his al-Muhallak: “beneficence to animals is an
act of righteousness and piety. Any failure to assure and assist in their well-being is tantamount to sin
and offense.”160 The Prophet reportedly stated “He that unduly cuts down a tree shall be directed to
hell.”161 Similarly, he established the first environmental sanctuary, an area extending to twelve miles
around Madinah: he restricted fishing in some areas, restricted logging within twelve miles of Madinah,
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and restricted hunting within four miles.162 Al-Khayyat notes “some Ulemas (scholars) see in such
interdictions a keen desire to preserve the environment.

Such an awareness soon became deeply

engrained in the minds of Muslims.”163 Fourth, Islam rewards efforts to rekindle the natural environment.
In a hadith on the authority of Anas b. Malik, The Prophet Mohammed states “Every Muslim who plants
a tree or plants a crop from which birds, people or animals eat shall have a reward for a beneficient
act.”164
The importance of balance and equilibrium are also stressed.165 Environmental care “stands on
the basis of faith … [and] any kind of corruption whatsoever – whether in the natural or social
environment – is considered a violation of God’s law.”166 Because the duty to protect the environment is
rooted in Divine orders, it easily exceeds duties present in third-generation human rights, which are at
best intangible, at worst unknown to laypeople. Environmentalism in Islam is firmly rooted in the human
role as vicegerent,167 and the responsibility God placed in humans in the form of amanah (trust).168 In his
paper submitted to the United Nations Conference on Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Dr. Nanji notes that “[t]he role of stewardship entrusted to human beings also
necessitates an ethical stance towards the development of natural resources and the public space inhabited
by human beings.169 This stewardship, thus defined, is both a right and a duty to perpetuate these gifts of
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Allah.170 The role of humans as vicegerents profoundly affects the meaning of exploitation of natural
resources, when it occurs. In the capitalist model based on self-interested individuals, “exploitation”
carries the negative connotation of using the environment for individual self-benefit. In the Islamic model
based on vicegerency, exploitation carries the positive connotation of a trusteeship with God meant to
benefit the group. Thus, Dr. Nasir notes that “in the Shari’a, ownership is a social responsibility, a fact
which confirms the relationship between community and land, and the extent of Islam’s interest in
regulating it.”171 Similarly, Jose Abraham notes that although some scholars translate the Arabic word
“Sakhkhara” in Qur’anic ayat on the environment172 to mean “subjection,” “subservience,” or
“exploitation,” “the relationship between human and non-human is not of domination or exploitation but
that of the trust (amanah) placed with human beings by God,” making any attempt at human domination a
“mockery to Allah.”173 Thus, through both the doctrine of vicegerency and the amanah (trust) placed in
humans by God, exploitation becomes a divinely-motivated duty of group improvement, not a selfmotivated form of destruction.

b. The Right to Development
The “right to development,” first articulated by Senegalese jurist Keba M’Baye in 1972,174 was
codified in 1986 in the non-binding United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development.175 Since
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the Declaration on the Right to Development, it has become increasingly common to embody
development norms in international legal instruments,176 and the Secretary General of the United Nations
has created a list of 81 international instruments codifying a commitment to social development.177 Like
the right to peace and the right to a healthy environment, the right to development meets all three of
Wellman’s requirements for a “third generation” solidarity right in international law: It imposes joint
obligations,178 it imposes duties on both states and individuals,179 and is a group right, in addition to being
an individual one.180
Like the right to a healthy environment, there is solid evidence that the notion of the right to
development has existed in Islamic law since the revealed texts. The emphasis on socioeconomic justice
and human egalitarianism is, in fact, so strong in Islam that Professor Fazlur Rahman identifies it as “[t]he
basic élan of the Qur’an.”181 Dr. Azim Nanji notes that “The Qur’an is explicit in stating that human
conduct and aspirations have relevance as acts of faith within the wider human, social and cultural
context.”182 For example, the Holy Qur’an states that “[t]he righteous are those who … give from what
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they have, to: relatives, orphans, those in need, the ones away from home, those who ask, and in order to
free the enslaved.”183
Parallel to the international conception of third generation solidarity rights, Professor Belkhoja
argues that the right to development under Islamic law is based in both individual and collective
responsibility:

“Individuals are definitely responsible for the achievement of development for the

individual has been mandated to discharge the amanah [trust] entrusted to him by Almighty Allah. …
Likewise, society is equally responsible because it is required to establish cooperation and solidarity. …
The role of the State is far more extensive because it … must shoulder the burdens which cannot be borne
by the individuals in view of their limited resources.”184

This wording parallels the international

conception almost to the letter: “All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually
and collectively, [but] States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international
conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.”185
Yet, although one may conclude from this language that the balance of obligations in the right to
development is similar in its international law and Islamic law formulations, the element of individual
duty is in fact significantly stronger in Islamic law, because the tie between the individual and the group
is stronger.186 For example, the Declaration on the Right to Development is almost completely worded in
terms of state duties, with only one clear reference to individual obligations.187 Comparatively, the role of
individual duty in the Islamic conception of the right to development is enormous, as evidenced in
practices such as Zakat (almsgiving), one of the five pillars of Islam.188 This increased individual duty
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can be traced to two important characteristics of Islamic law. First, just as explained supra in the context
of the right to a healthy environment,189 Professor Muhammad Al-Habib Belkhoja attributes this
individual duty to further the right to development in the human role as vicergerent.190

Professor

Ammara agrees, arguing that the Qur’an explicitly supports the right to development based in the concept
of vicegerency in Ascent 24-25.191 He notes that, as a vicegerent of God, each Muslim individual assumes
a duty to the development of others, as is clear in the Qur’anic verse Iron 7 tying vicegerency (“heirs”)
with almsgiving: “Spend in Charity out of the substance whereof he has made you Heirs.”192
Second, this increased importance of individual duty can also be attributed to the spiritual nature
of Islamic law, which facilitates a level of solidarity beyond that present in international law. 193 For
example, the Hadith “Whoever sleeps satiated whilst his neighbour is hungry does not belong to our
community,”194 elevates the individual duty to contribute to the group right to development so high, that
failure results in banishment from the community itself. The brief reference to individual duty in the UN
Declaration on the Right to Development pales by comparison. But, banishment from the community
(ummah) would not be conceivable if the community were not strong or even coherent, often the case in
the international community. In Islam, by contrast, the community is coherent, defined, and spiritually
relevant: it is the community of believers in Islam itself. Thus, it is the spiritual basis of Islamic law that
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both creates a solid ummah and helps to solidify individual duties towards that ummah.195

With this

strong ummah, the principle of vicegerency can have meaning in the context of the right to development.

c. Right to Peace
Of the three most common third generation solidarity rights, the right to peace is the least defined
and developed in international human rights law.196 Although the preservation of peace is a primary
purpose of the United Nations, and figures prominently in the UN Charter, the international community
did not begin framing peace as a third generation solidarity right until several decades later.197 First, the
UN Human Rights Commission framed it as a right in a controversial 1976 resolution.198 In 1978, it was
codified as an individual and collective right by the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Preparation
of Societies for Life in Peace.199 The 1984 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace further codified
the right.200 Although the right has been recognized in international law, its contours are still vague,201
and the above efforts met with harsh protest from several Western powers who argued that general
promotion of peace should be left to other branches of the UN, particularly the Security Council, not
added to the list of more-established, classic human rights.202
In Islam, the omnipresence of the concept of peace cannot be understated. It is present in the
salutation exchanged between Muslims at each meeting. A prayer for peace is repeated twice at the end
195
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of each of Muslims’ five daily prayers.203 The very word “Islam” shares its root with the word for “Peace”
in Arabic.204 Peace is one of the ninety-nine attributes of Allah.205 There are over one hundred Qur’anic
verses discussing the importance of peace.206 Indeed, this ever-presence of Peace in Islam led Prefessor
Mohammed Yessef to state “[t]he alpha and omega of Islam is peace.”207 Professor Yessef finds an
individual responsibility to promote peace in the following Hadith, narrated by Imam Muslim in his
Sahih: “You shall not enter Paradise until you believe (in Allah), and you shall not believe (in Allah)
until you love one another; shall I tell you something which, if you were to do it, you would love one
another?

Disseminate (and disclose) peace among yourselves.”208

Thus, this Hadith elevates the

dissemination of peace to a condition precedent to belief in Allah, one of the five Pillars of Islam.
Because the five pillars of Islam represent “the core and common denominator, the five essential and
obligatory practices all Muslims accept and follow,”209 it would be literally impossible for Imam Muslim
to create a stronger statement regarding the duty to disseminate and disclose peace than to make one of
these five pillars dependent on it. Peace was also made a condition precedent to faith itself in the Hadith
by Al-Bukhari, Muslim, and Ibn Hanbal: “The Prophet (Peace be upon Him), says ‘You only have faith
when you desire for your brother what you desire for yourself.’”210
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This peace manifests itself in different ways and on different levels, all the way from simple daily
acts such as greetings, to kind offerings of food, to financial assistance and charity, to peace on a global
scale.211 In expounding his vision of Peace and Security in Islamic law, Professor Yessef follows a model
very similar to Carl Wellman’s conception of third generation human rights, in which “[e]ach segment of
the population, each category of people, indeed each individual has his own way of spreading peace.”212
Just as Wellman argues that third generation solidarity rights require the “concerted efforts of all the
actors on the social scene,”213 Yessef recognizes that the burden to strive for social peace “must not be
shouldered by the state alone. The private sector must help the public authorities.”214
Several experts have discussed the Islamic conception of the elements of the right to Peace. For
example, in his 1990 Hassanian lecture,215 Professor Idris Alaoui Abdallaoui developed a right to
international neighborliness with Islamic sources beginning with the following Hadith narrated by Imam
Al Bukhari: “Gabriel has recommended that I should take care of my neighbour so often that I began to
think that he (Gabriel) wanted to make a heir of him (the neighbor).”216

Similarly, Dr. Abbas Al Jirari

has discussed the right to Peace under the rubric of the concept of coexistence in Islam.217

In

combination, these analyses emphasize three distinguishing elements of the right to peace in Islamic law.
First, both Abdallaoui and Al Jirari discuss mutual understanding, an area that cannot be underestimated.
Adballaoui states that “[t]he Almighty Creator justifies the fact of creating mankind [sic] by His desire
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that they know one another, as knowing one another leads to cooperation and fraternity. There are
different ways of getting to know one another and they all call for political, economical social and cultural
cooperation in general,” citing the Holy Qur’an 49:13: “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and
female and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another!”218 Al-Jirari cites this same
verse to emphasize the importance of mutual understanding in Islam.219 This element of the Islamic
conception of the right to peace is exemplary of the strong component of duty in a third generation right, a
duty which falls both on the individual and the group.220
Related to mutual understanding, the second component of the right to peace in Islam is
tolerance. This is based in the belief by Muslims that the existence of cultural difference was the will of
Allah, an idea which finds support in the Qur’an: “And if they Lord had willed, He verily would have
made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing,”221 and “And of His signs is the creation of the
heavens and the earth, and the differences of your languages and colours.”222 Based on these verses, Al
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Jirari concludes that “God’s rule on earth is based upon the differences between human beings, be they
race, language or religious differences or any other difference in any one of the components of
civilization and culture.”223
One issue commonly raised in the context of tolerance is jihad (holy war), a concept frequently
misunderstood by non-Muslims and misapplied by a select group of Muslim fundamentalists completely
outside the context of Islamic law.224 According to Al Jirari, “Islam considers that the basic attitude of
man is his inclination toward peace, and that recourse to war occurs only in absolutely necessary
situations,” supporting this proposition with the Hadith reported by Al-Bukhari and Muslim, which states
“He (Peace be Upon him) said “Do not wish to fight your enemy and ask for God’s forgiveness, if you do
encounter him, call the name of God and be firm.’”225 Similarly, the Qur’an states “Oh You who believe,
… cooperate in good and in pity, and do not cooperate in bad and aggression.”226 Interpreting jihad as
recourse to war in the solitary case of self defense makes it the functional equivalent of Article 51 of the
UN Charter, 227 a fundamental component of the international understanding of peace and security.
Finally, the third component in the Islamic conception of the right to peace as outlined by
Abdallaoui is the importance of compliance regardless of weak enforcement mechanisms, a common
concern for international law. Abdallaoui explains that “international neighbourliness in islam is based
on forgiveness. … because faith is based on good will and choice, not on compulsion, force, and
constraint.”228 Similarly, he states that “If the jurists see that the international laws lack an important
element which is compulsion, because there is no authority which is above all the nation and which can
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guarantee the respect of those international laws by force when it is necessary, Islam considers contracts
and covenants of any kind as binding on the level of individuals as well as communities.”229 Moreover,
he notes that the right to Peace “in Islam is based on keeping one’s vow, which is one of the principles of
Islam and one of the bases of faith.”230
Abdallaoui’s focus on compliance strikes at international law’s perpetual Achille’s heal:
enforcement. Since the Peace of Westphalia, because the international legal system lacks an over-arching
sovereign power, it has consistently struggled with convenient breaches of international law by selfinterested States situated to exact more benefit through breach than through adherence. This trend has
continued in the “new world order,” in which the the world’s only superpower violates Security Council
resolutions or other international legal norms,231 weakens the International Criminal Court,232 disregards
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the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice,233 denies access to UN Special Rapporteurs,234
and fails to ratify235 or severely limits the effect of236 human rights treaties. In a religious paradigm, such
as Islamic law, compliance pull for otherwise non-justiciable moral duties237 is present and strong – it is
Allah.238 By contrast, the secular human rights movement lacks any remotely comparable unifying force,
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and the right to Peace, like other solidarity rights, is unfortunately likely to remain much more hortatory
and aspirational.239

d. Conclusion
As Wellman has argued, solidarity rights are complex: In addition to the elements of individual
right and group duty present in first and second generation rights, third generation solidarity rights
emphasize elements of group right and individual duty. The vast majority of scholars considering
solidarity rights concentrate on their group right element. Although Islamic law does recognize group
rights,240 it places paramount importance on individual duties, and thus provides an ideal paradigm within
which further study of third generation solidarity rights becomes possible. This emphasis on individual
duty is clear in all three of the most common third generation human rights examined in this section. It is
a defining aspect of these rights as viewed from an Islamic perspective, carrying far greater weight than
their “group right” component.
While many scholars remain mired in a discussion of the problematic aspect of third generation
solidarity rights’ “group right” component, a close examination of these rights shows that their
“individual duty” aspect provides an even bigger barrier. This barrier is eliminated in the context of
religious law, such as Islamic law, by the compliance pull of God and religiosity itself. For example,
Professor Fazlur Rahman explains that the concept of taqwa, central to the morality of the Qur’an, “is
239
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usually translated as ‘piety’ or ‘God-fearingness’ but which in the various Qur’anic contexts may be
defined as ‘a mental state of responsibility from which an agent’s actions proceed but which recognizes
that the criterion of judgment upon them lies outside him.’ … The idea of a secular law, insofar as it
makes this state indifferent to its obedience, which is consequently conceived in mechanical terms, is the
very abnegation of taqwa.”241 Because the secular human rights movement lacks such a motivating force
to compel individual duties towards a communitarian whole, it is the “individual duty” component of
third generation human rights that poses the greatest threat towards their existence.

V.

Conclusion
Efforts of moderate cultural relativists to develop a core group of universal human rights based

primarily on western conceptions are incomplete and should not stand alone.

If such a group of

universally applicable human rights norms does exist, the search to discover it must begin in multiple
legal traditions, for no culture can contain all the universal answers towards which all other cultures
should aspire. This article makes one such attempt, analyzing the extent to which the newest generation
of human rights, the third generation solidarity rights, represent developing universal values based in nonwestern traditions. Finding a strong basis for, and rich understanding of, third generation rights in Islamic
law, this article concludes that whereas other scholars have noted the complexities posed by the status of
third-generation solidarity rights as “group rights,” the real complexity lies in their component of
individual duties. In Islam, where the individual is the vicegerent of God, a steward responsible for the
interests of the community,242 individual duties to fulfill third generation solidarity rights become
significantly stronger than their aspirational equivalents in international human rights law. Because the
secular human rights movement lacks any equivalent unifying force or compliance pull on individuals,
the move towards solidarity rights is all the more remarkable, but also significantly more fragile. Rather
than criticizing the development of third-generation solidarity rights, international human rights
241
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commentators should recognize them as developing universal values, with traditions such as Islamic law
at their core.
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